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 1 
Invisible Punishment is Wrong Ȃ But Why? The Normative Basis of Criticism of 
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the way in which criminal justice systems cause ǮǯǤǮǤǯ
phenomenon has been widely criticised in recent criminological literature. 
However, the critics do not normally explore or defend the normative basis of 
their claims Ȃ as they need to if their arguments are to strike home against 
sceptics. I argue that the normative basis of ǯ
involving important normative claims about the responsibilities that societies 
have towards those who break the law. Some important strands of criticism, I 
claim, rest on the view that we have associative duties towards offenders (and 
their dependents and communities) as fellow participants in a collective 
democratic enterprise, duties that are violated when states impose or allow 
harms that go significantly beyond the sentence. 
 
1.  
This paper is concerned with the way in which criminal justice systems cause ǮǯǤǮǡǯǡǮǤǯ1 In order to 
introduce the questions we will be dealing with, it will be helpful to start with an 
analogy. 
 
Say I am asked to examine a PhD thesis. The decision that I make will have ǯǡr the meaning of the 
past four or five years that the person has spent working on the thesis. Is the 
                                                        
1 ǤǡǮǣǯǤ and M. Chesney-
Lind (eds), Invisible Punishment: the Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment (New York: 
New Press, 2002), pp. 15-36. 
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candidate going to proceed into the future with the stamp of approval resulting 
from a successful doctorate; or will they rather have to live with the public 
judgement that the time they spent on the thesis was, if not time wasted, then at 
least radically unsuccessful? I might be very much aware of these facts about 
how unfortunate it would be for the candidate to fail the thesis; but I might also 
make a deliberate effort not to allow those facts to cloud my mind as I attempt to 
weigh up the merits of the thesis. Furthermore, I may think, as I come to make 
my decision on whether to pass the thesis or not, that my duties in the situation 
are limited to ensuring the integrity of the decision Ȃ that it is made on academic 
merit Ȃ and that the likelihood of bad consequences for the candidate should not 
count as a decisive reason not to fail the thesis if its academic content merits a 
fail. Here it seems at least sometimes unobjectionable to exclude many of the 
wider consequences of the decision from my deliberations, and to make a 
decision even though I foresee that it will have bad consequences. 
 
This example shows that we do not always have a responsibility to avoid causing 
foreseeable harms. Sometimes the importance of fulfilling our other 
responsibilities permits us to allow harms as a side effect. Of course, if I failed the 
thesis precisely in order to make the candidate suffer in that way I would be 
doing something seriously wrong. However, sometimes one can be in the ǯ
compelled to do it anyway. We could avoid causing these harms, but only at the 
cost of not fulfilling our other responsibilities properly.  
 
 3 
How is this relevant to a paper about the collateral consequences of conviction? 
Collateral consequences can be understood as the further repercussions of a ǯǡs and 
their communities. The initial purpose of this opening example is to point out 
that it is not enough for critics of collateral consequences of conviction to show 
simply that punishment regimes foreseeably cause these wider repercussions. 
This might be true, but it might, as with the case of the examiner, simply be a cost 
that has to be borne in order to carry out the task of punishing (whatever the 
justification for undertaking that task is).  
 
However, the other purpose of the example is to motivate us to explain why 
criminal justice policy should not be founded on the same attitude to collateral 
consequences as that taken by ǤǮǯ
urge that matters cannot be so simple as in my depiction of the examiner case Ȃ 
and I agree. Indeed, even in the examiner case, one might think that the sensitive 
examiner may feel bound to take some steps to alleviate the costs of her decision 
for the candidate. In the case of criminal justice, the critics of invisible 
punishment argue that those who design and implement sentencing policy 
should give much more thought to the foreseeable effects of their decisions: 
decisions such as, for instance, the war on drugs; the removal of judicial 
discretion and the introduction of mandatory sentencing grids; the expansion of 
supplementary punishments; the cutting of social security and welfare for ex-
offenders. Even where these decisions aim at an end that might be considered 
reasonable, more thought should be given to the kinds of collateral damage that 
the chosen ways of achieving that goal are likely to lead to.  
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The argument of this paper is that, in pressing ǡǮǯ
responsibilities that societies have towards those who violate their criminal law. 
Furthermore, I will argue, these claims involve some commitment to the idea 
that members of such societies, including those of their members who are 
offenders, are in a special kind of relationship with one another. 
 
To illustrate this point, consider a different case: not that of a PhD examiner, but 
rather of a PhD supervisor. Say one of my students is working poorly, though I 
know that they are capable of better. Nevertheless, I might know that telling 
them this directly will Ȃ in the short-term at least Ȃ cause them serious hurt, and 
possibly undermine their sense that they are competent to succeed in their work. 
In this case it seems that I would have the responsibility to make my judgement 
known, just as in the examiner case, but I would also have a responsibility to 
ameliorate as far as possible the bad consequences of their receiving that 
criticism (consistently with making sure they take it seriously), and to help 
restore their sense that they can deal with the criticism and come to produce 
better work in the future. I would have the responsibility to make some 
uncomfortable truths known, even though this will be painful and have the 
potential for destabilisation; but also the responsibility to take steps to prevent 
that destabilisation from wrecking the potential that lies in my student. And the 
point is: I have these extra responsibilities to my student because, as their 
supervisor, I am in a different kind of relationship with them than I would if our 
relationship was one of examiner-examinee. As their supervisor, I have 
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responsibilities for their academic development as part of my role in that 
relationship that cannot be given up at the first sign that the student is being 
distracted from fulfilling their potential. They are in some sense in my hands, and 
their development has been entrusted to me. Ultimately it will be better for the 
student Ȃ but also for myself, and the academic community as a whole Ȃ if I stick 
with it and help to pick up the pieces. I may thereby be able to help the student to 
create more productive patterns of work that will have lasting value. That is the 
basis of my responsibilities in the role of supervisor. 
 
My thought is that the same can be said about responsibilities that societies have 
not simply to allow the collateral harms of conviction to lie where they fall, but 
rather to take steps to ameliorate them and prevent them from reverberating 
through the lives of individuals, their dependents and communities. As we will 
see, there are a number of ways in which societies have responsibilities to ǮǤǯsee that some 
collateral harms of one sort or another violate certain basic universal duties that 
people have to one another: humanitarian duties to offenders, or violate their 
human rights. However, in line with my opening examples, I will also be 
interested in exploring the idea that it is in part because of a shared relationship 
that we have responsibilities towards offenders to ensure, through our political 
representatives and the mechanisms of the state, that the due punishment does 
not lead to disproportionate harm. Developing recent work by democratic 
theorist Elizabeth Anderson, I will argue that the relationship that gives rise to 
these responsibilities is that of fellow participants in a collective democratic 
enterprise. 
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This paper therefore does not attempt to add to the already significant empirical 
evidence that collateral harms occur as a result of criminal conviction Ȃ and in 
particular (mass) incarceration. Neither will I be disputing the claims of those 
who argue that it is a deep problem that regimes of punishment in apparently 
democratic societies impose or allow such harms. Rather my approach is ǣǮǯ
argument about how we should understand its normative basis. I will argue that 
we should see the proponents of such criticism as urging us to recognise 
associative duties that we have towards offenders (and their dependents and 
communities) as fellow participants in a collective democratic enterprise, duties 
that are violated when states impose or allow harms that go significantly beyond 
the sentence.  
 
2.  
To start with, we need to fix our target, and explain what the harms of invisible 
punishment are. To do this we can distinguish three different ways in which 
punishment can cause harm. First of all, there is the harm directly imposed by 
the headline sentence itself: call this the imposed harm announced in the sentence. 
Punishment is the practice of intentionally imposing harm in response to 
infractions of some designated behavioural standards Ȃ and philosophers have 
expended a significant amount of energy in attempts to explain under what 
circumstances this practice can be justified.2 If punishment is not justified then 
                                                        
2 	ǡǤǤǡǮǡǯStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/  
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the whole topic of responsibility for collateral harms has a simple answer: 
societies are responsible for collateral harms because they are harms caused in 
the process of doing something that is in itself evil or wrong. The question of 
sorting out responsibility for collateral harms becomes challenging when we 
think that these harms are caused in the process of some necessary and 
important undertaking that gives us responsibilities to carry it out 
sympathetically but firmly, as in my cases of the examiner or the supervisor. The 
main reasons that punishments have been held to be necessary or important are 
to do with either doing justice or protecting society (or both): that punishments 
deter crime or disorder; that they incapacitate the dangerous; that they reform 
or educate; that they give offenders their just deserts; or that they express 
justified disapprobation of the offence.  
 ǡǮǯ
nevertheless like that sentence in being intentionally imposed on the individual ǤǡǮǡǯǡ ǮǡǯǮǯ
sanctions or disqualifications such as voting bans, and restrictions on rights to 
public housing or welfare support.3 Whether civil or criminal,4 however, these 
are still deprivations or harms to which the offender is liable because of their 
offence, and so it can (justifiably) seem like hair-splitting to insist that the 
labelling marks an important principled difference. We can call this category 
                                                        
3 ǡǮǡǯǤ ? ?-16. 
4 ǤǤǡǮǣ	ǡǯCambridge Law Journal 3 (1997), pp. 599-626. 
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imposed supplementary harmsǤǮǯǣǮǯ
punishment; that because of this they are hard to measure, and hence do not 
tend to attract much attention from policy makers and reformers; that similarly, 
they tend to be ignored in the main discussions of sentencing policy; and that 
they tend to be introduced in ways that bypass the main legislative channels for 
criminal legislation. Yet these below-the-radar sanctions have significant effects 
on the chances of offenders returning to normal life after completing their 
headline sentence. In contrast to our first category, this is one of the things that Ǯǯ punishment: a sanction that is intentionally 
imposed by the state as a way of causing a disability or harm in response to some 
criminal behaviour, which is in some way supplementary to the headline 
sentence and hence in some way hidden, yet which has a significant and lasting ǯǤ 
 ǡǡǮǯ
harms that are not part of the directly and intentionally imposed punishment 
itself, but are rather a foreseeable effect that punishment has on individuals and 
their communities. We can call these foreseeable collateral harms of punishment. 
Amongst these harms might be the loss of employment and developmental 
opportunities suffered by offenders, as well as their subjection to stigmatisation 
or labelling. But these harms go beyond the offenders themselves. As Donald 
Braman says: 
 
 9 
Ǯ
with child care to diminished relationships and social isolation. While 
these impacts are felt within the families of individual prisoners, the 
broader social impact of mass incarceration reverberates through 
communities and our society as a whole. When most families in a 
neighbourhood lose fathers to prison, the distortion of family structure 
affects relationship norms between men and women as well as between 
parents and children, reshaping family and community across 
generations. And, while families in poor neighbourhoods have 
traditionally been able to employ extended networks of kin and friends to 
weather hard times, incarceration strains these sustaining relationships, ǯǤ
As a result, incarceration is producing deep social transformations in the 
families and communities of prisoners Ȃ families and communities, it 
should be noted, that are disproportionately poor, urban, and African-Ǥǯ5 
 
Rather than harms that are intentionally imposed as part of the punishment 
(albeit not part of the sentence that is publicly announced), the focus in this third 
category is on harms that are foreseeable side-effects of conviction and ǤǮǯȂ 
unlike the harms directly imposed through sanctions Ȃ it is not official or publicly 
avowed policy to inflict them. Housing restrictions and voting bans may be 
                                                        
5 ǤǡǮ	ǡǯ-Lind (eds), Invisible Punishment, 
p. 117-118. 
 10 
secretive in a number of ways; but when the state imposes such things it does so 
with the intention of making life harder for certain individuals as a response to 
their unlawful behaviour. With this third category, however, we are dealing with 
the wider reverberating effects of punishment that are not intended in this sense, 
however easily they may be foreseen. The fact that these harms are foreseen and 
yet allowed to come about rather than intentionally imposed does not make 
them any less serious to those who suffer them; the side-effects of criminal 
conviction Ȃ particular when someone is sentenced to imprisonment Ȃ can be 
deep and wide-ranging. And it may not necessarily lessen the responsibility of 
those who allow them that they did not inflict them intentionally. We cannot 
always wash our hands of the matter and walk away. Nevertheless, as my 
opening examples suggest, our responsibility to help pick up the pieces can vary 
with context, and in particular with the relation we stand in to those concerned. 
We need some account of the positive duties of respect and care that we have 
towards offenders to foresee and take steps to avoid, mitigate or ameliorate 
these harms.  
 
3. 
What I have suggested so far is that any critique of the wider social effects of 
criminal justice policies needs to be accompanied by some positive account of 
the responsibilities that societies have to their members, responsibilities which 
militate against adopting the attitude of the PhD examiner. Nevertheless, it is a 
striking fact about some of the most insightful contemporary criminological 
criǮǯ that, while they make claims that have 
normative implications, they appear reluctant to do more than hint at their 
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underlying normative commitments. For instance, 
ǣǮ
could offenders have been so thoroughly deprived of their citizenship status and ǫǯ6 He provides a diagnosis of our current 
situation that explains how this state of affairs has become possible, indeed 
actual. But his diagnosis is clearly meant to have a normative bite. He writes: 
 Ǯǡ
at all, are viewed as fundamentally opposed to those of the public. If the 
choice is between subjecting offenders to greater restriction or else ǡǯ
the safe choice every time. In consequence, and without much discussion, 
the interests of the offender and even his or her legal rights, are routinely Ǥǯ7 
 
Now one implication of this passage is that the state of affairs Garland points to ǯand citizenship rights due 
consideration. It implies that decision-makers (whether that be specific policy 
makers, legislators, or the democratic public as a whole8) are failing in their ǯǤ
However, this raises some important questions: how should the interests of 
offenders be weighted against the interests of the public as a whole; what 
principles should we rely on to make decisions in this area, if not the ones 
                                                        
6 D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 183. 
7 Garland, Culture of Control, p. 181. 
8 ǮǡǡǯǤ ? ? ?Ȃ to which the 
reǡǮǡǫǯ 
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Garland is criticising; and in what overall picture of the relation between 
individual and state do our answers to these first two questions have their 
home? Many alternatives to the state of affairs Garland is criticising may have 
been possible, but which ones should we have chosen? Garland does not ignore 
these questions entirely, but he gives them only a fleeting glance, saying that we ǮȏȐǥǤǯ9 These remarks risk coming across as 
preaching to the converted rather than a sustained argument that is self-aware 
about its own normative commitments. 
 
It might be said that I am targeting Garland unfairly: either that his work is not 
representative of critiques of invisible punishment; or that it is his purpose 
simply to diagnose and explain rather than to make positive recommendations. It 
is certainly true that some authors in this debate are clearer about their value-
base than Garland is.10 And it is also true that 
ǯ enterprise of 
understanding the structural developments that have brought us to where we 
are now is an essential part of the task. To be clear, my aim is not to criticise 
Garland or belittle his achievement. However, what I would like to suggest is that 
the normatively-loaded critique that those like Garland are making in will be 
stronger if it also involves an explicit defence of its underlying commitments. If it 
contains some developed normative argument that is capable of engaging with 
and exposing the weaknesses of those who would defend the status quo it will 
                                                        
9 Garland, Culture of Control, p. 184. 
10 ǡǮǣǯǡ New York University Law Review 85 (2010), pp. 457Ȃ534 
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have a full ǯ
current policies and institutions is so inadequate. After all, there are without 
doubt people who, unlike Garland, do think that the interests of offenders are at 
odds with Ȃ or at least can safely be sacrificed for Ȃ the interests of the public as a Ǥ
ǯ
something to say to such people that explains why they are wrong to think that 
offenders have forfeited their rights to due consideration. The present paper is 
meant as a contribution to that collective enterprise. 
 
The task, then, is to spell out a convincing account of the positive responsibilities 
that societies have towards offenders. It will be helpful to start off by asking to 
what extent we have responsibilities to avoid or limit harms in our first category, 
imposed harms announced in the sentence, that is, those directly imposed by the 
headline sentence given to the offender. The answer to this depends on whether Ǥǯsimply be attempting to 
limit the harms this practice causes but abolishing it altogether. But if (in some 
circumstances at least) punishment can be justified then we have duties to 
ensure that the punishments that are imposed are proportionate and not 
excessive. Each of these purposes attributed to punishment will not only explain 
why those who commit criminal actions should be punished, but they will also 
give us a way of thinking about how much punishment would be justifiable. And 
here the thought is that punishment does not take place in a moral vacuum. 
Those who punish are not morally free to do anything they like to the offender. 
Rather punishment takes place against the background of other duties that we 
have to the offender, and which cannot all be seen as cancelled by the offence. 
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Punishment may be necessary, for instance, but it has to be carried out in a way 
that is respectful of the life of the person on whom it is imposed; and for this 
reason we have duties not to punish more severely than is necessary for those 
purposes to be fulfilled. In this way, each of these justifications give us a guide as 
to what a proportionate punishment might be for a particular offender and a 
particular offence: the minimal amount of harm necessary to achieve whatever 
goals that punishment serves.  
 
The upshot of this is that if punishment can be justified then we do not have a 
responsibility always to avoid imposing harm. If it is important, for instance, that 
a society should set out some basic standards for how citizens should treat one 
another, and mark violations of those standards with a sanction that expresses 
that no one should have been treated in that way, then we have a responsibility 
to cause the harms of that sanction rather than to avoid them altogether. 
However, even if some such justification is plausible, it will only cover the 
imposition of harms that are proportionate rather than excessive. Because we 
have responsibilities not to harm the offender unnecessarily, we have no 
mandate to punish beyond what is necessary for whatever purpose it is that 
might justify punishment in the first place. If punishment is justified, then, those 
who are charged with imposing it (that is those who design sentencing policy 
and who implement it) do not have a free hand. Rather they have duties to the 
offenders they are dealing with: to carry out their roles conscientiously, and 
impose nothing more harmful than they are entitled to. This gives us a first way 
in which societies have responsibilities to limit the harms they cause to 
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offenders: we have a responsibility not to impose harms as part of the sentence 
that are excessive given the justified purposes of punishment. 
 
What we have said about imposed harms announced in the sentence also gives us 
one reason why imposed supplementary harms have attracted so much 
criticism.11 ǮǯǮǡǯhe harms of this second category are 
straightforwardly like punishments in the sense that they are directly and 
intentionally imposed with the intention of making life harder for the offender 
because of their offence. Yet these officially-imposed restrictions on accessing 
public services, or participating in public office, or voting in elections, are ways 
in which the harms intentionally imposed in punishment can extend beyond 
anything that might reasonably be considered proportional to the offence. As ǡǮ
enough; oǯǤǯ12 The fact that these punishments 
occur away from the public gaze may mean that their excess does not cause any 
significant public outcry Ȃ at least not amongst those sections of the public 
whose voices tend to be heard. But, as with any punishment that is 
disproportionate, the problem here is that those who are charged with imposing 
the punishments are not carrying out the role allotted to them: they have 
allowed sanctions to expand disproportionately. They are therefore violating 
duties to limit harm to offenders, and acting as though they had a morally free 
hand. Thus one way to interpret criticism of collateral consequences of 
punishment is to see it as a complaint about the disproportionality of the total 
                                                        
11 For a philosophical examination of possible justifications of such sanctions, see ǤǡǮ-ǡǯJournal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2014), pp. 33-48 
12 ǤǡǮǯǡǤ ? ?Ǥ 
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sanction imposed on offenders, when all the hidden restrictions and deprivations 
are added in to the sum. 
 
4 
Concerns about whether sanctions are excessive, however, are only part, and ǡǮǤǯǡ
focus on whether those charged with designing and implementing punishments 
proportionate to their purpose are carrying out their roles properly. However, 
another ground for criticism is the thought that responsibilities to the offender 
do not simply end with the conscientious carrying out of proportionate 
punishment. As with the analogous cases of the supervisor and the examiner 
with which I started, it would be a failure in the way society administers 
punishment if it were simply to impose it and walk away: it would be a denial of 
the kind of relationship that obtains between the one making the criticism and 
the one receiving it. Rather, this criticism goes, there are positive duties of 
respect and care that societies have to offenders, and which explain why it is 
wrong to simply treat it as the responsibility of offenders (and their dependents 
and communities) to deal by themselves with the consequences of their 
conviction.  
 
As I have said, I am interested in taking this idea of a special relationship 
seriously, and below we will look at the way that this might be developed by 
thinking about the relationship citizens have with one another in a democracy. 
However, before we get on to that I would like to look briefly at two other ways 
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of thinking about such positive duties, which do not involve any special 
relationship that obtains with the offender, but are rather grounded in a 
universal human relationship. This is to see our responsibilities to offender, for 
instance, as humanitarian duties to those in urgent need; or as duties arising 
from human rights.  
 
Humanitarian duties are duties that a) any moral agent has towards any human 
being, independently of any particular relationship we are or are not in with 
them, and b) are based on urgent welfare needs. These might be thought of as 
duties to be a Good (or at least Minimally Decent) Samaritan, and to come to the 
aid of those who are in desperate need, especially when it will not cost one very 
much to do so. Important ǯ
famous case of coming across a child drowning in a pond Ȃ regardless of any 
particular tie or special relationship one has to the child Ȃ even imagining that 
one had no such tie Ȃ it would be grossly wrong not to save the child if one were 
the only passer-by who could do so.13 This view would say that the reason we 
should not allow offenders to suffer certain forms of punishment or certain side-
effects of punishment is that we have duties to offenders Ȃ as we would have 
towards anyone Ȃ to come to their aid of when they are in an emergency 
situation suffering from basic forms of deprivation, need or harm. One way of 
seeing this type of duty is as stemming from the compassion that a decent person 
would feel in the face of suffering.  
 
                                                        
13 ǤǡǮ	ǤǡǯPhilosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 229-243. 
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Human rights, I will take it, are rights that individuals have simply by virtue of 
their humanity. These rights, I will assume, include rights not to be subjected to 
certain forms of treatment, such as killing, torture and enslavement, but also 
rights to be provided with certain goods, such as a certain level of subsistence, or 
an education; I will also assume that these human rights can require the 
existence of certain kinds of political institutions, such as democratic processes 
to satisfy rights to free and fair elections, or the rule of law to satisfy rights 
against discrimination, or a centralised police force to satisfy the right to the 
protection of property. Framing the issue in terms of human rights can be an 
appealing way for critics of invisible punishment to make their case because 
these rights are, it is thought, universal and non-negotiable. Human rights 
standards are a widely accepted measure of adequacy for states, which means 
that there is an important rhetorical force in being able to show that states are in 
breach. As regards invisible punishment, critics might, for instance, pursue the 
argument that such punishments violate rights against discrimination, rights to 
fair trial, rights to liberty, rights to basic levels of subsistence and so on. Or they 
might argue that there are socio-economic human rights Ȃ often missing from 
canonical statements of human rights such as the European Convention Ȃ such as 
rights to a decent basic standard of living.14 Offenders, their dependents and 
their communities, it might be argued, have a human right to a decent living that 
is threatened by policies of mass incarceration, or by life-bans on access to basic 
public welfare services. Where there are rights there are duties: duties on others 
to avoid the prohibited forms of treatment, or by provide the goods in question. 
The duties arising from human rights are sometimes said to be owed by any 
                                                        
14 C. Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Ch. 1. 
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morally competent human being has towards any other human being, simply in 
virtue of their humanity. However, some human rights could only be satisfied by 
organisations such as states. 
 
I would argue that some supplementary or collateral harms of punishment can 
indeed be seen as violating basic humanitarian duties, or as violating human 
rights. In addition to the points we have already mentioned, the withdrawal of 
state support may push individuals into extremes of need that violate their 
human rights; the refusal to rescue them from that plight may breach duties of 
humanity. Or status as an offender may prevent them, either formally or 
informally, from seeking the protection of law when others threaten their human 
rights. Furthermore, the fact that some of these ways in which offenders are 
treated breach human rights standards, or violate humanitarian duties, are ways 
of rebutting the charge that, in committing their crimes, offenders have thereby 
lost the right to the respect and care that we are talking about. Plausibly there 
are human rights that are inalienable, that is, that one can never lose, such as the 
right not to be tortured or enslaved; although punishment takes away liberty, 
offenders are recognised as having other human rights that remain in force and 
need to be respected.  
 
Looking to basic duties of humanity or human rights are therefore important Ǯ punishmeǯ
oǮǤǯevertheless, I will argue that some of the duties ǡǮǯǡare not best accounted for by human 
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rights or humanitarian duties. Human rights and humanitarian duties are duties 
that are universal and owed by any human being to any human being. But while 
we have these basic duties to all human beings, we have richer sets of duties to 
those with whom we are in particular kinds of relationships. For instance, as a ǯ
and consideration that I do not owe to all others. By analogy, I will suggest, 
offenders who come within the jurisdiction of our criminal justice system are 
owed treatment that goes beyond merely fulfilling their basic human rights.  
 
Thus some of our duties to offenders, I will argue, are associative duties.15 
Associative duties are duties that we owe to particular people by virtue of the 
fact that we are in some relationship, group or association with them Ȃ e.g. 
friendship, family, collegiality, citizenship.16 Associative duties are not owed by 
all humans to all humans; rather they are owed by particular individuals to other 
particular individuals as members of relationships or associations of which they 
are co-members. The scope of the duties Ȃ that is, who they are owed to Ȃ is 
therefore limited and determined by membership of the relationship in question. 
This is not a strange idea: for instance, when I make a promise or enter a 
contract I do not thereby have duties to all of humanity; rather I have created a 
                                                        
15 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, 1984), Ch. 2-3; 
R. Dworkin, ǯ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); ǤǡǮǣǡǯPolitical Studies 54 (2006), pp. 427-443, ǮǣǡǯPolitical Studies 55 (2007), pp. 1-
19; J. Seglow, Defending Associative Duties (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). For criticism of the idea, 
see ǤǤǡǮǡǯEthics 106 (1996), pp. 247-273. For a recent 
survey and assessmǡǤǡǮǡǯPhilosophy 
Compass 6 (2011), pp. 477- ? ? ?ǡǮǣǡǯPhilosophy 
Compass 6 (2011), 488-496. 
16 Cf. the discussion of political community and its responsibilities in R. A. Duff, Punishment, 
Crime and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Ch. 3.  
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new duty that I owe only to the parties of the contract. Nevertheless, the other 
important distinguishing feature of associative duties is that they are unlike 
contractual or other duties that arise from some voluntary transaction (like 
saying ǮǡǯǯȌ
undertakes those duties. Rather associative duties are duties that arise because ǯǡ
not be one that one has entered voluntarily. Since not all relationships give rise 
to duties (think of the relationship to an abusive partner) the basis of the duties, 
that is, the reason why the duties exist, is that the relationship is in some way a 
valuable one. An example of associative duties might be duties that one has ǯǣǯǡor 
indeed to have parents at all, ǯ
parents that goes beyond what one owes to others, simply because they are oǯ
parents. Because these duties are not universal, the content of the duties is 
determined, not by universal human interests, but by the nature of the 
relationship itself. For instance, the duties that teachers owe to their students by 
virtue of relationship they share, derive from the nature and overall point of that 
activity they are jointly engaged in and the goods that arise from it.  
 
What kinds of associative duties arise from membership of a valuable 
relationship? First of all, there are directed duties to mark or acknowledge the ǯǣ
person by failing to treat them as a friend, or as a colleague, or as a fellow citizen, ǯdealings with them. What 
these duties require depends very much on context and the nature of the 
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relationship. Secondly, there are directed duties of concern regarding the well-ǤǮl-ǯsomething like the ability to enjoy the goods internal to the Ǥǡǡǯ
ability to engage with the course; only if I become more a friend than a teacher 
do I have a non-derivative concern with their welfare more generally. Thirdly, 
there are non-directed duties that have to do with maintaining the fabric of the 
relationship and its continued existence, for instance, the material conditions or 
levels of trust and shared belief that make the relationship possible, and which 
are not owed to particular individuals. If democracy is an inherently valuable 
relationship that relies in part on the possibility of trust, hope and even faith in ǯǡǡhen there may be duties to promote and not 
unreasonably to damage the possibility of such attitudes.  
 
The valuable relationship status that grounds associative duties in the political 
realm is most obviously thought of as that of citizenship.17 Citizenship status 
involves, not merely being a subject of an authority, but participating in that 
authority; not merely being a recipient of the benefits of membership in the 
political community, but in some sense having responsibility for the care and 
sustenance of that community. Participating in an enterprise in which a group of 
people govern themselves Ȃ that is, take full responsibility for the direction care 
and upkeep of the community Ȃ while competently providing the goods of social 
union is a valuable thing ǯǤ having those 
                                                        
17 The locus classicus ǤǤǡǮ
ǡǯȋǣ
University Press, 1950), pp. 1-85. 
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responsibilities means being in a valuable relationship with the others who are 
also entrusted with care of the community, and that brings with it special 
political, civic and social rights. My thought is therefore that shared citizenship Ȃ 
shared responsibilities to care for the political realm Ȃ represents a valuable 
relationship, and that duties to mark and respect that relationship can and 
should go beyond human rights standards. The overall picture of the normative-
political realm that I am suggesting is hence that states have humanitarian and 
human rights-based duties towards all persons within its compass (offenders 
and non-offenders alike) and that, in addition, it can have particular duties 
towards citizens (or at least towards those who are full members of the political 
community, however that is to be defined) by virtue of the fact that citizens 
participate in a valuable relationship with one another and with the state.  
 
5. 
How does the idea of associative duties apply to collateral harms and invisible 
punishments? A starting point is to argue that invisible punishment can cause 
what we can call the Inclusion Problem:  
 
Some collateral consequences of conviction contribute to social exclusion 
and make it disproportionately harder for those who have been convicted 
(and their dependents and communities) to enjoy the benefits of social 
membership. 
 
The Inclusion Problem is based on the idea that life for an individual person 
must almost always be lived in the context of a society; and that this is normally 
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a blessing rather than a curse, since societies can provide myriad benefits and 
opportunities that would have been unavailable outside of society. Therefore 
social membership is an inevitability, but not normally to be regretted. Yet 
punishment regimes can play a significant role in denying individuals the 
benefits of social membership that they are due. In order to spell out the benefits 
that individuals are due by virtue of social membership, we need to turn to that 
which a theory of social justice would claim is owed to any member of society.18 
These might include responsibilities on the state to: 
 
1. Provide opportunities for sound housing 
2. Provide social security against poverty and its associated ills 
3. Provide basic standards of healthcare 
4. Provide opportunities for meaningful productive, economically enriching 
work 
5. Provide opportunities to live in a diverse and productive local community 
6. Provide opportunities for voting and other forms of democratic 
participation 
7. Provide what John Rawls calls Ǯ-ǯ19 
 
These responsibilities can be thought of as responsibilities to ensure that 
offenders share in the benefits of social cooperation that accrue in their society, 
and do not suffer from forms of social exclusion that mean they are barred from 
enjoying these benefits and opportunities.  
                                                        
18 For a good representative discussion, see Fabre, Social Rights, Ch. 1. 
19 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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However, questions about including offenders in the fair distribution of the 
benefits of social cooperation are not the only ways in which associative duties 
might make a difference to our understanding of the normative situation. These 
problems take on a further dimension, I will argue, in democratic societies, or 
societies that aspire to be democratic. It is part of the creed of democracy that it 
is a self-governing form of society. This involves the idea that citizens are not 
simply subjects of a dominating executive power, and neither are they mere 
passive consumers of public services. Rather, the idea is that they participate, 
actively and on equal terms with others, in the government of their state and in 
the major decisions about its direction. This ideal of participation on terms of 
equality is not simply about the right to an equal say, a right which is exercised 
once every few years in elections. Rather it is a matter of having an equal social 
standing in concrete and repeated social interactions: for democratic equality to 
be meaningful it must be part of the lived reality of social relations.  
 
To see this, we can follow Elizabeth Anderson in distinguishing three ways of 
thinking about democracy: first as a membership organization; secondly, as a 
mode of governance; and thirdly as a way of life.20 That is to say, democracy 
might be thought of first of all as a certain group who are organized politically 
and have a certain kind of sovereignty; secondly, as a way in which that group is 
governed Ȃ that is, by democratic procedures, whatever those are taken to be; 
and thirdly, as a certain kind of culture and ethos which consists, as Anderson 
                                                        
20 E. Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). See ǤǡǮǣǤ-ǡǯǤ and J. 
Christman (eds), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 213-
227. 
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ǡǮǤǯ21 These different ways of 
thinking about democracy can be distinguished, but they should nevertheless be 
thought of as three different perspectives on a single working entity, where the 
idea of democracy as a way of life is central. Democratic decision-making 
procedures will not work Ȃ will not be accepted or implemented or treated as 
binding Ȃ unless they take place against the background of a culture that sees 
those procedures as a meaningful political expression of the underlying culture 
and ethos of their way of relating to their fellow citizens.  
 
The key value of democracy is that individuals live on terms of equality. That is, 
they are able to participate in political society Ȃ a society that produces goods 
such as security and welfare, and allows for the development of all manner of 
practices and activities that extend forms of human flourishing Ȃ on what can 
meaningfully be called an equal basis. One aspect of this is that we participate in 
the government of this society on an equal basis, not simply voting but by 
questioning, arguing, deliberating in the debates that precede any vote, where 
we are treated as having as much a right to anyone else to work out what we 
think. But it also involves being given a certain kind of equal authority or 
recognition in social interactions: we are not dependent on the goodwill of 
others, but have an independent equal standing.  
 
In this way we can see membership in a shared democratic way of life as giving 
us associative duties to our fellow members. These include duties to ensure they 
                                                        
21 ǡǮǡǯǤ ? ? ?Ǥ 
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can participate in formal procedures of governance, but also duties to include 
them in deliberative procedures, and most fundamentally, to give them equal 
standing in our interactions with them. We owe it to our fellows to treat them as 
agents with whom we are engaged in working out how our democracy should go 
forward. That is an important project, dealing with the issues that any political 
society faces, and trying to do so in a way that maintains or works towards 
conditions of equality. It gives us a special tie to those with whom we must try to 
make this work, and with whom we must continue the conversation. This goes 
beyond human rights, even though human rights are also rooted in an ideal of 
equality. Whereas human rights is rooted in some notion of fundamental human 
interests, or fundamental dignity, that we all share, the equality of democracy is 
participation on equal terms in a certain kind of cooperative relationship. In a ǡǯ-partner: 
this would of course go beyond simply recognizing their human rights to include 
the way one sees and treats them as sharing responsibility with you for 
organizing your life together.  
 
If we accept this ideal of democracy (in some form), punishment regimes face a Ǥ	ǯy 
means that a society that aspires to be democratic cannot tolerate the idea of a 
semi-permanent body of second-class citizens. Second-class citizens would be 
mere subjects of state power and/or mere consumers of state services; they 
would not be equal partners in the enterprise of self-government. Thus the ideal 
of equality pushes towards inclusion. A society cannot claim to be democratic 
and yet put its citizens in a position in which they are denied the basis of equal 
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standing. Yet the ability to stand as an equal in social interaction is threatened by 
the collateral harms of conviction that we have been looking at in a number of 
ways. As Elizabeth Anderson has written, supplementary sanctions Ȃ which 
offenders often have to carry with them for life Ȃ can have the effect of denying a 
large class of citizens the basic protections of the rule of law, and hence of ǮǤǯ22 She argues that this expresses and 
reinforces an attitude according to which there is a neat and relatively 
permanent division of citizens into the criminal and the non-criminal. Being a 
member of the criminal class, or having a criminal status, comes to be thought of 
as a permanent designation according to which one is not owed the basic 
concern and benefits owed to other citizens. Furthermore, as we have seen, 
oǮǯǮǯ
further hidden burdens that can undermine the official position that offenders 
are being treated as free and equal participants in a democracy. Consequences of 
conviction Ȃ such as reduced employment possibilities, restrictions on voting 
rights and political participation, restrictions on the use of public services, ǡǯǡǡǯȂ ǯǤ 
Since this status must be more than merely formal but must enter into the lived 
reality of social interaction; and since, in order to enter into lived reality, it must 
have some material basis that provides citizens with certain really-existing 
capabilities; a society cannot on the one hand claim to be democratic and on the 
other hand deny its citizens what they need to be independent and active 
participants. As Uggen, Manza and Thompson say: 
                                                        
22 ǤǡǮǡǯThe Good Society 23 (2014), pp. 103-113. 
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 Ǯ
questions about the meaning and practice of democracy. The barriers to 
full polity membership faced by convicted felons are substantial and wide 
ranging, although they are usually ignored in public debates. A dizzying 
array of informal barriers also impedes the performance of citizenship 
duties, in particular those related to employment, education, and re-
establisǥȏȐhe civil penalties imposed 
with a criminal conviction effectively deny felons the full rights of 
citizenship. This denial, in turn, makes performing the duties of Ǥǯ23 
 
Thus democracies face a distinct form of the Inclusion Problem. It is crucial that 
this version of the Inclusion Problem is not simply about being able to 
participate in the formal duties of citizenship as a mode of governance. It is also ǯǤ
Inclusion Problem: 
 
Some collateral consequences of conviction make it significantly less 
likely, both that citizens can benefit from social membership, and that 
they can actively play their role in a democratic polity, participating as 
equals in a wide range of social interactions. 
 
                                                        
23 C. Uggen, J. Manza ǤǡǮǡǡǯAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol. 605 
(2006), pp. 281-310, at p. 283. 
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The Democratic Inclusion Problem rests on a view in which members of 
democracies have associative duties to one another. These are duties to treat one 
another as equals in the organisation of political life, and in the sustaining and 
developing of the democratic way of life. It is to see them and treat them as 
agents to whom one is bound in cooperative relations. 
 
6. 
I have argued that the duties that we have looked at in this section of the paper 
a) are genuine duties, and b) go beyond humanitarian duties or human rights. 
This certainly seems true for humanitarian duties, which are minimal duties to 
rescue people from desperate circumstances: they are addressed to basic needs 
and are often thought of as temporary rather than permanent commitments 
(once the emergency has been addressed, the duty is fulfilled and cancelled). 
What of human rights Ȃ how much do human rights standards demand? This is a 
much-debated issue in political philosophy at the moment, with proponents of Ǯǯǡ24 while Ǯǯ
claim that there are more ambitious positive human rights of meaningful choice 
and access to valuable activities.25 If human rights are merely basic rights then it 
seems clear that our duties to offenders go well beyond duties to meet their 
human rights. However, it might be argued that the basic rights approach is 
inadequate, and that recognising the equal value of human beings means 
recognising that each person has an equal right to a substantively decent life. 
                                                        
24 H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980). 
25 See Fabre, Social Rights. 
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Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, of course, but it is worth 
noting that the proponents of the more ambitious approach to human rights ǯ
by suitably ambitious human rights standards, without the need to appeal to 
associative duties. For this argument to work, it would have to be shown that all 
the rights of offenders can be explained in terms of more basic human rights 
standards. By contrast, the suggestion of this paper is that we get a richer and 
more generous account of the rights of offenders if we see them as fellow citizens 
to whom we have particular demanding duties as fellow members of a valuable 
association, and that such an approach is attractive and plausible. 
 
My argument has proceeded at a fairly abstract level. However, one way to 
illustrate the benefits of the associative view in more practical terms is to look at 
some of the claims made by Lerman and Weaver in their book, Arresting 
Citizenship.26 The argument of the book is complex, but in part it involves the 
claim that patterns of interaction with criminal justice officials such as stop-and-
search ȋǮǯȌshould be seen as the 
infliction of indignities, particularly when they are repeated and racially 
motivated; and that repeated subjection to such indignities can undermine the 
democratic fabric through the way in which they contribute to shaping the 
attitudes of those affected towards the public power in at least two ways. First of 
all, they undermine the sense that criminal justice officials are responsive and 
accountable to those whom they are stopping; and secondly, they undermine the 
                                                        
26 A. E. Lerman and V. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American 
Crime Control (London: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
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sense that the public power is in some sense under the control of citizens Ȃ that 
these citizens in particular might have a voice that could be brought to bear on 
tǤǯ claims 
can neatly be analysed in terms of the schema of associative duties that I 
sketched earlier, and that they therefore give some evidence in favour of the 
associative view. For instance, the associative view can explain why repeated 
subjection to stop-and-search should be regarded as an indignity. It is an 
indignity because it is incompatible with recognition as a member of the valuable 
collective enterprise of democracy. To be recognised as a member of that 
valuable enterprise is in part to be afforded a degree of trustǡǯǯupholding and sustaining that 
enterprise. Yet to be continually and disrespectfully stopped and searched is to 
be distrusted in a way that expresses and communicates a view of oneself as 
second-class rather than as a full citizen whose status it is to help uphold the 
enterprise. Furthermore, according to my sketch, associative duties also 
comprise duties to promote the well-being of fellow participants in ways that 
connect with their participation in the shared enterprise. For instance, if the 
associative duties view were correct one would expect there to be duties to 
ensure that fellow citizens are given opportunities to develop the capacities to be 
full citizens, and given opportunities to exercise those capacities. It is a sign that 
we take there to be such associative duties that we are outraged by the fact that 
patterns of stop-and-search stymie such capacities. Finally, we could also 
observe that the actions of criminal justice officials reported by Lerman and 
Weaver seem to violate a basic democratic associative duty: treating citizens as 
people to whom one is, as a public official, accountable and responsive. Rather 
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ǡǮǯ
are made to feel as though they are the enemy against whom citizens are to be 
protected. This brief discussion of the expressive power of stop-and-search 
shows that in various ways there can be a practical and explanatory pay-off to 
the appeal to associative duties. 
 
7.  
Finally let me turn to an objection to the associative account of duties towards 
offenders. I have been exploring the idea that duties a) not to impose certain 
sorts of supplements to punishment, and b) to protect offenders from certain bad 
consequences of offending both derive from the identity of offenders as our 
fellow citizens. This, the objection proceeds, is all very well for those offenders 
who are citizens. However, what of offenders who do not have citizenship, who 
are illegal immigrants, or visitors? The implication of my argument seems to be 
that these offenders are not due the same consideration: we do not have the 
same duties towards offenders who are non-citizens as towards those who are. 
For instance, in Norway Ȃ where the famously liberal criminal justice system Ǯǯording to which those imprisoned lose rights to 
liberty but retain as far as possible all other civil rights Ȃ benefits such as 
conjugal visits can be granted to offenders who are Norwegian citizens that are 
not granted to non-citizens. Is that unacceptable? Now this objection is perfectly 
correct to point out that it is a premiss of the argument of this paper that, if 
democratic citizenship matters as something valuable we have in common, it 
should make a difference to the way we treat one another. Hence it follows that 
those with whom we are building a democracy can legitimately have a privileged 
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place of some sort in our deliberations and policies. However, there are at least 
three ways to deflect concern about this conclusion. The first is that, while the 
argument implies the need for some differential treatment of co-citizens, we 
have not yet specified what that treatment should be. We have special duties to 
co-citizens to mark the tie between us, to uphold their capacity to participate in 
the relationship we share, and non-directed duties to care for the fabric of the 
relationship. Whether that issues in a potentially troubling and discriminatory Ǯǯ-citizens depends on which forms of treatment are plausibly 
necessary to do justice to the special tie. At the very least, that depends on a 
further elaboration of the position set out here. Secondly, the position defended Ǯǯ
relationship: rather, we should recognise a range of general duties that we would 
have towards non-citizen offenders. Therefore even if we have no associative 
duties to non-citizen offenders, we would still have humanitarian duties, duties 
to respect human rights, and so on. Thirdly, even if there are no direct 
associative duties towards non-citizen offenders, there may still be good reasons 
not to treat them differently from citizen offenders; and some of those reasons 
may be associative reasons to do with the character and health of the democratic 
fabric. True, it might be said, there is no duty to extend the benefits of citizenship 
to non-citizens in our criminal justice system. Nevertheless, a polity that works 
too hard to divide non-citizens from citizens, and that flaunts benefits that it 
grants to citizens while depriving non-citizens of them, is not a tolerant, 
welcoming and inclusive democracy, and risks breeding justified resentment of 
its practices. Even if, as I have argued here, the basis of some central duties to 
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offenders is associative, there may nevertheless be strong reasons to model the 
treatment of non-citizen offenders closely on that of citizen offenders. 
 
8. 
In this paper I have argued that those who are concerned about the wider social 
effects of criminal justice regimes should do more to consider and spell out the 
normative basis of their position. In doing so, they will better able to address the 
attitudes of their opponents, and engage those who see no problem with they 
ways things currently operate. I provided two analogous cases, the PhD 
examiner and the supervisor, and suggested that we need to show that criminal 
justice should be conceived more along the lines of the latter than the former. To 
make that argument, I have claimed that we need to show that we are in a 
relationship to offenders such that we have responsibilities to help them deal 
with the aftermath of conviction, just as the supervisor has responsibilities to 
help a student deal with the aftermath of justified criticism. One way to do so Ȃ 
the way that in this paper I have recommended Ȃ is to take the idea of a special ǡǯ
role in that relationship. On this approach, the responsibilities we have towards 
offenders are in part associative duties. This is not to deny that there are also 
such duties as humanitarian and human rights-based duties, which we have a 
duty to apply to our dealings with all human beings; but it is to insist that 
political community brings with it duties to recognise others as citizens that go 
beyond those human-wide standards. Citizenship, I claimed, can be seen as a Ǯǯǯǡ 
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governance, but also in the way in which one appears and acts in civil society. 
Taking the associative-citizenship approach, I have suggested, can help us in our 
attempts to argue that interactions with the criminal justice system (from 
imprisonment to collateral consequences to stop-and-search) violate basic 
democratic values.27 
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